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Generic Construction of Hybrid Public Key Traitor Tracing with
Full-Public-Traceability
Duong Hieu Phan , Reihaneh Safavi-Nain , and Dongvu Tonien
Abstract. In Eurocrypt 2005, Chabanne, Phan and Pointcheval introduced an interesting property for traitor
tracing schemes called public traceability, which makes tracing a black-box public operation. However, their
proposed scheme only worked for two users and an open question proposed by authors was to provide this
property for multi-user systems.
In this paper, we give a comprehensive solution to this problem by giving a generic construction for a hybrid
traitor tracing scheme that provides full-public-traceability. We follow the Tag KEM/DEM paradigm of hybrid
encryption systems and extend it to multi-receiver scenario. We define Tag-BroadcastKEM/DEM and construct
a secure Tag-BroadcastKEM from a CCA secure PKE and target-collision resistant hash function. We will then
use this Tag-BroadcastKEM together with a semantically secure DEM to give a generic construction for Hybrid
Public Key Broadcast Encryption. The scheme has a black box tracing algorithm that always correctly identifies
a traitor. The hybrid structure makes the system very efficient, both in terms of computation and communication
cost. Finally we show a method of reducing the communication cost by using codes with identifiable parent
property.
1 Introduction
Broadcast encryption and traitor tracing systems are the main cryptographic primitives for secure dis-
tribution of copyrighted digital content. In broadcast encryption systems the user group is dynamic and
changes over time and access control is by distributing a new session key to authorised users in each
session. The session key is used to securely encrypt (e.g. using AES) the content. The separation of con-
tent encryption and session key encryption provides flexibility in choosing encryption algorithms that
are suitable for specific content (e.g. MPEG2 streams).
Traitor tracing systems however, aim at providing traceability against colluding users who have con-
structed a pirate decoder that can illegally decrypt the content. Public key traitor tracing schemes allow
anyone to send content to members of an authorised group. In the model of tracing proposed in [CFN94],
tracing is performed by a trusted authority who has access to the secret key of all users. The tracer is able
to identify one of the c traitors who have colluded to construct a pirate decoder. The tracing algorithm
may always correctly identify a traitor, or it may have ε error in which case in some cases the tracing
algorithm either fails to identify a colluder, or it outputs an innocent user as a traitor.
Full Public Traceability. In Eurocrypt 2005, Chabanne, Phan and Pointcheval (CPP05) introduced the
notion of public traceability where tracing is a black-box and publicly computable procedure. This is
an interesting property that strengthens the overall security of the system as it separates the two tasks
of key generation and tracing and allows all users to perform tracing on a pirate decoder. However their
construction of fully public traceability system only worked for two users (it also required a new strong
computational assumptions). The restriction to two user systems was due to a synthesis method that
was inspired by a construction in [KY02] that used c-secure codes. However in using this approach to
multi-user case, public traceability will be lost because tracing in c-secure codes is a private operation
performed by a trusted centre. Authors raised the construction of a multi-receiver traitor tracing scheme
with full public traceability as an interesting open problem.
Efficiency. Efficiency of broadcast encryption systems is often measured in terms of (i) ciphertext rate
that captures the extra bandwidth that is required for transmission of the ciphertext, measured as the
ratio of ciphertext length to plaintext length and, (ii) computational efficiency of performing encryption
and decryption operations. The two most efficient systems from ciphertext rate view points are KY02
and CPP05 scheme, both with constant ciphertext rate. However both schemes require exponentiation
of group elements followed by hashing for encryption and decryption of messages and so compared to
symmetric key encryption systems, are inefficient.
In two party systems, Hybrid Tag-KEM/DEM provides a secure, efficient, and flexible method of
encrypting messages using public key encryption systems for delivering the key information and us-
ing symmetric key systems for the encryption of the actual data. In this approach, Key Encapsulation
Mechanism (KEM) encrypts a short random key in a header, and a Data Encapsulation Mechanism
(DEM) uses this key to encrypt the message into a ciphertext using a symmetric encryption scheme. It
is shown [AGKS05] that strong security for the ciphertext can be guaranteed with a semantically secure
DEM and CCA security of KEM.
Our contributions In this paper, we answer the open question of CCP05 by constructing a generic
Hybrid Public Key Traitor Tracing that provides full public traceability and very efficient.
Our approach can be summarised as follows. We first extend the Tag KEM/DEM paradigm of hy-
brid encryption systems to multi-receiver scenario and define Hybrid Tag-BroadcastKEM/DEM (Hybrid-
PKBE). In Hybrid-PKBE the random key that is used for the encryption of a message is encrypted by
TBKEM. This key is only extractable by authorized receivers. We define security of Hybrid-PKBE and
prove a result similar to Hybrid Tag-KEM/DEM. We show that a Replayable CCA secure Hybrid-PKBE
can be obtained from a Replayable CCA secure TBKEM and a semantically secure DEM. Replayable
CCA (RCCA) security was introduced in [CKN03] to capture a security notion that is strictly weaker
than CCA but sufficient for many practical applications.
Next we give a construction of a RCCA secure TBKEM (in above sense) from a CCA secure public
key encryption (PKE) system and a target collision free hash function. Combining this TBKEM and a
semantically secure DEM gives a secure Hybrid-PKBE. Moreover, we will show that this construction of
Hybrid-PKBE support a tracing algorithm and hence it is a Hybrid Public Key Traitor Tracing (Hybrid-
PKTT). The tracing algorithm is black-box and only uses the public key of the system and so the system
has full public traceability. This provides an elegant solution to the open problem of CPP05.
The hybrid construction makes the system very efficient. The ciphertext rate for long messages ap-
proaches one, and computational efficiency is obtained because of the decoupling of key encapsulation
mechanism and data encryption module. The RCCA security of the system makes it the first construction
of traitor tracing systems with this level of security (compared to previous constructions with constant
ciphertext rate).
In the final section of the paper, we focus on increasing efficiency of the system. The communication
overhead in the above system is a linear function of the size of the receiver group . Although for long
messages and fixed size groups this gives a ciphertext rate of 1 (asymptotically), but it is desirable to
reduce the size of the ciphertext overhead to make it more applicable for large groups. We use an approach
similar to KY02 and CPP05, replacing collusion-secure codes with IPP codes. This reduces the length
of the header and makes it logarithmic in the number of users. Interestingly, the composition preserves
full public traceability as, unlike collusion-secure codes, IPP codes have public tracing algorithm.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Public-key Broadcast Encryption (PKBE)
A public-key broadcast encryption (without revocation, without traceability) consists of the following
algorithms:
– Key generation algorithm PKBE.Gen(1λ, n)→ (pk, sk1, . . . , skn):
An algorithm that generates a public-key pk and n private-keys sk1, sk2, . . . , skn.
– Encryption algorithm PKBE.Encpk(m)→ c:
An algorithm that encrypts a message m into c by a public key pk.
– Decryption algorithm PKBE.Decski(c)→ m:
An algorithm that decrypts a ciphertext c to m by a secret key ski.
The security against replayable adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (RCCA) is defined as follows. Let
Apkbe be a polytime oracle machine that plays the following game.
[GAME.PKBE]
Step 1. (pk, sk1, . . . , skn)← PKBE.Gen(1λ, n)
Step 2. (m0,m1)← A
Opkbe
pkbe (pk)
Step 3. b← {0, 1}, c∗ ← PKBE.Encpk(mb)
Step 4. b̂← AOpkbepkbe (c∗)
Here Opkbe denotes the decryption oracle. A decryption query is of the form (i, c) where i is an
integer ∈ [1, n] and c is a ciphertext with a constraint that in Step 4 c must be different from c∗. To
answer this query, the oracle calculates PKBE.Decski(c) = m. In Step 2 the oracle outputsm. Moreover,
in Step 4, it checks: if m = m0 or m = m1 then it outputs ⊥, otherwise it outputs m. We define
εpkbe-rcca,Apkbe = |Pr[b̂ = b] − 1/2|, and εpkbe-rcca = max(εpkbe-rcca,Apkbe), where the maximum is taken
over all polytime machines Apkbe. We say that a PKBE is RCCA secure if εpkbe-rcca is negligible in λ.
Public Key Traitor Tracing Scheme with Public Traceability. A public key traitor tracing (PKTT) scheme
is a public key broadcast encryption with an extra algorithm, the tracing algorithm. This tracing algorithm
takes as input the tracing information trace-infor and a pirate decoder D. It outputs at least one of the
users (called traitors) who have collaborated in producing the pirate decoder D. In a c-traitor tracing
scheme, we assume that there are at most c traitors who created the pirate decoder D. The other obvious
assumption on D is that D can effectively reverse the encryption, i.e. D(PKBE.Encpk(m)) = m, with
high probability.
In general, tracing information trace-infor consists of some public information and some system
secret parameters (for example, users’ secret keys). Chabanne et. al introduced [CPP05] an interesting
property of public traceability for traitor tracing schemes in which trace-infor consists of only public key
of the system. Thus, it makes it possible for anyone to execute the tracing algorithm.
2.2 Data Encapsulation Mechanism (DEM)
A data encapsulation mechanism consists of the following algorithms:
– Setup algorithm DEM.Setup(1λ)→ KD:
An algorithm that specifies the symmetric key space KD.
– Encryption algorithm DEM.Encdk(m)→ c:
An algorithm that encrypts m into c using a symmetric-key dk ∈ KD.
– Decryption algorithm DEM.Decdk(c)→ m:
An algorithm that decrypts c to m using a symmetric-key dk ∈ KD.
The IND (indistinguishable against passive attack) security of DEM is defined as follows. Let Adem
be a poly-time oracle machine that plays the following game.
[GAME.DEM]
Step 1. KD ← DEM.Setup(1λ)
Step 2. (m0,m1)← Adem
Step 3. b← {0, 1}, dk ← KD, c← DEM.Encdk(mb)
Step 4. b̂← Adem(c)
We define εdem,Adem = |Pr[b̂ = b]− 1/2|, and εdem = max(εdem,Adem), where the maximum is taken
over all polytime machines Adem. We say that a DEM is IND secure if εdem is negligible in λ.
2.3 Target Collision Resistant Hash Functions
A familyH = {Hk : A → B}k∈K of keyed hash functions is target collision resistant if given a random
τ ∈ A and a random Hk ∈ H, it is computationally infeasible to find τ ′ ∈ A such that τ ′ 6= τ and
Hk(τ ′) = Hk(τ). A random function Hk ofH is called a target collision-free hash function. Associated
with Hk, we define the quantity εtch as εtch = maxPr[τ ′ ∈ A, τ ′ 6= τ,Hk(τ ′) = Hk(τ) : τ ← A, τ ′ ←
Atch(τ)] where the maximum is taken over all poly-time machines Atch.
3 Generic Construction of Hybrid PKBE
In this section, we generalize Abe et. al’s [AGKS05] Tag-KEM/DEM construction of Hybrid-PKE. We
show how to construct a hybrid public key broadcast encryption scheme (without revocation and traitor
tracing) using two components: a Tag-BroadcastKEM and a DEM, and with this construction, we prove
the following composition theorem,
(relaxed) CCA Tag-BKEM + semantic secure DEM→ (relaxed) CCA Hybrid-PKBE.
3.1 Tag-Broadcast Key Encapsulation Mechanism (TBKEM)
A tag-broadcast key encapsulation mechanism consists of the following algorithms:
– Key generation algorithm TBKEM.Gen(1λ, n)→ (pk, sk1, . . . , skn):
An algorithm that generates a public-key pk and n private-keys sk1, sk2, . . . , skn. It also specifies
tag space T and encapsulated key space KD.
– Key derivation algorithm TBKEM.Key(pk)→ (ω, dk):
An algorithm that generates a one-time key dk and internal state information ω.
– Encryption algorithm TBKEM.Enc(ω, τ)→ ψ:
An algorithm that encrypts dk (embedded in ω) into ψ using a tag τ .
– Decryption algorithm TBKEM.Decski(ψ, τ)→ dk:
An algorithm that recovers dk from ψ and τ using one of the private-key ski. It may output a special
symbol ⊥ 6∈ KD.
The RCCA security of TBKEM is defined as follows. Let Atbkem be a poly-time oracle machine that
plays the following game.
[GAME.TBKEM]
Step 1. (pk, sk1, . . . , skn)← TBKEM.Gen(1λ, n)
Step 2. (w, dk1)← TBKEM.Key(pk), dk0 ← KD, δ ← {0, 1}
Step 3. τ∗ ← AOtbkemtbkem (pk, dkδ)
Step 4. ψ∗ ← TBKEM.Enc(w, τ∗)
Step 5. δ̂ ← AOtbkemtbkem (ψ∗)
Here Otbkem denotes the decryption oracle. A decryption query is of the form (i, ψ, τ) where i is an
integer ∈ [1, n], τ is a tag and ψ is a ciphertext with a constraint that in Step 5 (ψ, τ) must be different
from (ψ∗, τ∗). To answer this query, the oracle calculates TBKEM.Decski(ψ, τ) = dk. In Step 3 the
oracle outputs dk. However, in Step 5, for a decryption query (i, ψ, τ), the oracle first checks if τ = τ∗
and if dk = dkδ, then outputs the symbol ⊥ 6∈ KD, otherwise outputs dk. In other words, the sole
difference between CCA security and RCCA security in the TBKEM model is that the adversary in the
RCCA security is forbidden to ask (ψ, τ) where τ = τ∗ and dk = dkδ. We remark that in TBKEM
game, the adversary only knows dkδ but not both dk0 and dk1.
We define εtbkem-rcca,Atbkem = |Pr[δ̂ = δ] − 1/2|, and εtbkem-rcca = max(εtbkem-rcca,Atbkem), where
the maximum is taken over all polytime machines Atbkem. We say that a TBKEM is RCCA secure if
εtbkem-rcca is negligible in λ. We will see later that TBKEM with RCCA security and can be constructed
from CCA-secure PKE and target collision-free hash function.
3.2 Hybrid Public Key Broadcast Encryption Scheme (Hybrid-PKBE)
The description of the hybrid public key broadcast encryption scheme is as follows.
– Algorithm Hybrid-PKBE.Gen(1λ, n)→ (pk, sk1, . . . , skn):
Call TBKEM.Gen(1λ, n)→ (pk, sk1, . . . , skn).
– Algorithm Hybrid-PKBE.Encpk(m)→ c: call TBKEM.Key(pk)→ (ω, dk),
DEM.Encdk(m)→ τ , TBKEM.Enc(ω, τ)→ ψ and set c = (ψ, τ).
– Algorithm Hybrid-PKBE.Decski(c)→ m: suppose c = (ψ, τ).
Call TBKEM.Decski(ψ, τ)→ dk and DEM.Decdk(τ)→ m.
Theorem 1. Hybrid-PKBE is RCCA secure under the assumptions that TBKEM is RCCA secure and
DEM is IND secure: εpkbe-rcca ≤ 2 εtbkem-rcca + εdem.
Proof. We prove the Hybrid-PKBE is RCCA secure using a sequence of games.
Game 0. Let Apkbe be an adversary that plays the following attack game in the definition of RCCA
security (section 2.1).
[GAME.PKBE0]
Step 1. (pk, sk1, . . . , skn)← TBKEM.Gen(1λ, n)
Step 2. (m0,m1)← A
Opkbe
pkbe (pk)
Step 3. b← {0, 1}, (ω, dk∗)← TBKEM.Key(pk),
τ∗ ← DEM.Encdk∗(mb), ψ∗ ← TBKEM.Enc(ω, τ∗)
Step 4. b̂← AOpkbepkbe (ψ∗, τ∗)
Let X0 be the event that b = b̂ in the above game then εpkbe-rcca,Apkbe = |Pr[X0]− 1/2|.
In Step 4, a decryption query is of the form (i, ψ, τ) where (ψ, τ) 6= (ψ∗, τ∗). To answer this query,
the oracle executes
Hybrid-PKBE.Decski(ψ, τ):
1. TBKEM.Decski(ψ, τ) = dk;
2. DEM.Decdk(τ) = m.
If m = m0 or m = m1 then Opkbe outputs ⊥, otherwise, it outputs m.
Game 1. We modify Game 0 in Step 3, instead of encrypting mb using a key produced by TBKEM.Key,
we encrypt mb using a random key.
[GAME.PKBE1]
Step 1. (pk, sk1, . . . , skn)← TBKEM.Gen(1λ, n)
Step 2. (m0,m1)← A
Opkbe
pkbe (pk)
Step 3. b← {0, 1}, (ω, dk1)← TBKEM.Key(pk),
dk0 ← KD, τ∗ ← DEM.Encdk0(mb), ψ∗ ← TBKEM.Enc(ω, τ∗)
Step 4. b̂← AOpkbepkbe (ψ∗, τ∗)
Let X1 be the event that b = b̂ in Game 1.
Claim 1. |Pr[X0]− Pr[X1]| ≤ 2εtbkem-rcca.
The proof of this claim can be found in the full version [PST06].
Claim 2. |Pr[X1]− 1/2| ≤ εdem.
The proof of this claim can be found in the full version [PST06].
Finally, we have
εpkbe-rcca,Apkbe = |Pr[X0]− 1/2|
≤ |Pr[X0]− Pr[X1]|+ |Pr[X1]− 1/2|
≤ 2 εtbkem-rcca + εdem,
thus, εpkbe-rcca ≤ 2 εtbkem-rcca + εdem, where εtbkem-rcca and εdem are assumed to be negligible.
Remark. We can also prove that
CCA Tag-BKEM + semantic secure DEM → CCA Hybrid-PKBE.
This is a more natural generalization of the result of Abe et. al [AGKS05]. However, we don’t know how
to construct, in a simple manner, a CCA TBKEM from PKE only. This is the reason we introduce the
notion of RCCA TBKEM which will be constructed from CCA PKE.
4 Construction of a Basic Hybrid-PKTT
4.1 How to construct TBKEM from PKE
In this section, we show a generic construction of a TBKEM that is RCCA secure from a CCA secure
PKE and a target collision-free hash function H . The construction is as follows.
– Algorithm TBKEM.Gen(1λ, n)→ (pk, sk1, . . . , skn):
For each i = 1, . . . , n, call PKE.Gen(1λ)→ (pki, ski). Set pk = (pk1, . . . , pkn).
– Algorithm TBKEM.Key(pk)→ (ω, dk):
Choose a random dk and set ω = pk||dk.
– Algorithm TBKEM.Enc(ω, τ)→ ψ (where ω = pk||dk):
Compute h = H(τ). Call PKE.Encpki(dk||h)→ σi for i = 1, . . . , n. Output ψ = (σ1, . . . , σn).
– Algorithm TBKEM.Decski(ψ, τ)→ dk or ⊥ (where ψ = (σ1, . . . , σn)):
Call PKE.Decski(σi)→ dk||h. If h = H(τ), return dk. Otherwise, return ⊥.
Theorem 2. TBKEM is RCCA secure under the assumptions that PKE is CCA secure and H is target
collision-free: εtbkem-rcca ≤ εtch + n εpke-cca.
We use the same technique as used for proof of Theorem 1, namely Game approach, to prove this theo-
rem. The proof can be found in the full version [PST06].
4.2 Basic Hybrid-PKTT
In section 3, we show how to construct a Hybrid-PKBE using a TBKEM and a DEM. In section 4, we
show how to construct a TBKEM using a PKE and a target collision-free hash function. In this section,
we combine the above two constructions. Thus, from a DEM, a PKE and a target collision-free hash
function, we can construct a Hybrid-PKBE. We show that this Hybrid-PKBE is very special: it is a
Hybrid-PKTT with full-public-traceability. Therefore, we have the following composition:
CCA PKE + semantic secure DEM + target collision-free hash function
→ RCCA Hybrid-PKTT with full-public-traceability.
The description of the Hybrid-PKTT is as follows.
Algorithm Hybrid-PKTT.Gen(1λ, n)→ (pk, sk1, . . . , skn):
For each i = 1, . . . , n, call PKE.Gen(1λ)→ (pki, ski). Set pk = (pk1, . . . , pkn).
Algorithm Hybrid-PKTT.Encpk(m)→ c:
Choose a random dk and call DEM.Encdk(m)→ τ . Compute h = H(τ) and for each i = 1, . . . , n,
call PKE.Encpki(dk||h)→ σi. Output c = (σ1, . . . , σn, τ).
Algorithm Hybrid-PKTT.Decski(c)→ m or ⊥, where c = (σ1, . . . , σn, τ):
Call PKE.Decski(σi) → dk||h. If h 6= H(τ), return ⊥. Otherwise, call DEM.Decdk(τ) → m and
output m.
Algorithm Hybrid-PKTT.Public-Trace(pk,D): A black-box traitor tracing algorithm that can be exe-
cuted by anyone using the public-key to find a traitor who had created pirate decoder.
– Choose random dk, m, and call Hybrid-PKTT.Encpk(m)→ (σ1, . . . , σn, τ).
– For each i = 1, . . . , n, choose random d′i 6= dk||h so that d′i has the same length as dk||h and call
PKE.Encpki(d
′
i)→ σ′i; modify the ciphertext and give them toD and check ifD(σ1, σ2, . . . , σn, τ)
?=
m, D(σ′1, σ2, . . . , σn, τ)
?= m, D(σ′1, σ′2, . . . , σn, τ)
?= m, . . . ,D(σ′1, σ′2, . . . , σ′n, τ)
?= m.
– Calculate the following probabilities
p0 = Pr[D(σ1, σ2, . . . , σn, τ) = m], p1 = Pr[D(σ′1, σ2, . . . , σn, τ) = m],
p2 = Pr[D(σ′1, σ′2, . . . , σn, τ) = m], . . . , pn = Pr[D(σ′1, σ′2, . . . , σ′n, τ) = m].
We assume thatD is a usable decoder so p0 is not negligible (indeed p0 ≈ 1), and obviously, pn ≈ 0.
So there must exist i such that |pi − pi−1| is not negligible, in this case, output i as a traitor.
The above scheme, without tracing algorithm, is a Hybrid-PKBE. The security of encryption of above
scheme, denoted by εpktt-rcca, is evidently independent of the tracing algorithm. Therefore, following
theorem is a corollary of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. Hybrid-PKTT is RCCA secure under the assumptions that PKE is CCA secure, H is target
collision-free, and DEM is IND secure: εpktt-rcca ≤ 2(εtch + n εpke-cca) + εdem.
We obtain thus a generic construction of RCCA Hybrid-PKTT with public traceability. One could doubt
about the RCCA model. This is, theoretically, a weaker model than the standard CCA. However, it seem
to be sufficiently secure for most practical purposes, as showed in [CKN03]. Moreover, in [CKN03], the
authors distinguish two types of RCCA: secretly detectable RCCA (sd-RCCA) and publicly detectable
RCCA (pd-RCCA). The former means that the detection of a ciphertext, whose underlying plaintext is
identical to the underlying plaintext of the challenge, requires secret information and the latter, which
is much less restricted, means that such a detection can be done from the public information only. The
RCCA used in our proof is publicly detectable RCCA. In fact, if c = (σ∗1, . . . , σ
∗
n, τ
∗) is a valid ciphertext
outputed by Hybrid-PKTT.Encpk(m), then anyone can choose random σ1, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σn to
construct a new ciphertext c′ = (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ∗i , σi+1, . . . , σn, τ
∗) so that the decryption of c′ under
the key ski gives back the original message m, i.e. Hybrid-PKTT.Encski(c) = m.
We call the above scheme the basic Hybrid-PKTT scheme. In this scheme, a ciphertext c consists of
a ciphertext body τ and a ciphertext header (σ1, . . . , σn). The ciphertext body τ has approximately the
same size as the message m. We can say somewhat that the transmission rate of the above scheme is
asymptotically 1 because the length of the message to be encrypted could be arbitrary.
The two practically inconveniences of the above scheme is that the size of the ciphertext header is
linear in the number of users and that the cost of reduction in the security proof is linear on the number
of user.
We can overcome both these problems by using the method in [KY02,CPP05] of using a convenient
code, namely the IPP codes. Remark that if we use the collusion secure code [BS98], the scheme does
not, unfortunately, support the public traceability anymore. The reason is that, in collusion secure code,
for tracing back a traitor from a codeword, one has use the secret permutation in the construction of
the code and therefore, only the center can do it. Why we don’t use the IPP code with the schemes in
[CPP05,KY02]? The obstacle is that the basic scheme in [CPP05,KY02] supports only 2 users and there
does not exist binary IPP codes. Fortunately, we can combine our basic scheme above with a q-ary IPP
code for any q ≥ 3. As the tracing procedure in IPP code does not require any secret information, the
combined scheme supports full public traceability.
We will present the hybrid scheme HybridIPP-PKTT based on IPP codes in the next section. We
remark that in order to use q-ary code, the parameter n in the above basic scheme must be set to n = q.
Since we can choose q as small as q = 3, the number of users in each basic scheme is small (n = q = 3),
the ciphertext header in the new scheme become small, the cost of reduction in the security proof become
constant, and this make the new scheme HybridIPP-PKTT become a very efficient scheme.
5 Hybrid-PKTT based on IPP codes
This is the most interesting section of our paper. We will show how to combine the basic scheme in
the previous section with a q-ary c-IPP code to construct an efficient hybrid traitor tracing scheme with
full-public-traceability.
5.1 IPP codes
LetQ be an alphabet set containing q symbols. If C = {w1, w2, . . . , wN} ⊂ Q`, then C is called a q-ary
code of size N and length `. Each wi ∈ C is called a codeword and we write wi = (wi,1, wi,2, . . . , wi,`)
where wi,j ∈ Q is called the jth component of the codeword wi.
We define descendants of a subset of codewords as follows. Let X ⊂ C and u = (u1, u2, . . . , u`) ∈
Q`. The word u is called a descendant of X if for any 1 ≤ j ≤ `, the jth component uj of u is equal
to a jth component of a codeword in X . In this case, codewords in X are called parent codewords of
u. For example, (3, 2, 1, 3) is a descendant of three codewords (3, 1, 1, 2), (1, 2, 1, 3) and (2, 2, 2, 2). We
denote by Desc(X) the set of all descendants of X . For a positive integer c, denote by Descc(C) the set
of all descendants of subsets of up to c codewords. Codes with identifiable parent property (IPP codes)
are defined as follows.
Definition 4. A code C is called c-IPP if, for any u ∈ Descc(C), there exists w ∈ C such that for any
X ⊂ C, if |X| ≤ c and u ∈ Desc(X) then w ∈ X .
In a c-IPP code, given a descendant u ∈ Descc(C), we can always identify at least one of its parent
codewords. Binary c-IPP codes (with more than two codewords) do not exists, thus in any c-IPP code,
the alphabet size q ≥ 3. There are many constructions [SW98,SSW01,TM05,TS06] of c-IPP codes. We
remark that even both c-IPP codes and c-collusion secure codes can be constructed with large number of
codewords of similar length, there are three major differences between them:
– In collusion secure codes, there is an error parameter that specifies the probability that the tracing
algorithm fails to output the correct parent codeword, however, in IPP code, there is not such error,
thus the tracing is error-free and a correct traitor is always identified.
– Collusion secure codes use secret permutation and thus the tracing algorithm cannot be made public,
whereas, in IPP codes, everything is public.
– Known collusion secure codes are binary codes, whereas, nontrivial IPP codes have alphabet size at
least 3. (Binary IPP code has at most two codewords).
5.2 Description of HybridIPP-PKTT
If a q-ary c-IPP code of size N and length ` is used, then constructing ` instances of Hybrid-PKTT, in
each instance of Hybrid-PKTT set the parameter n = q, we have a new public key traitor tracing called
HybridIPP-PKTT. In this new scheme, there are q` public keys and N users, each user holds ` secret
keys. The formal construction follows:
Let C = {ω1, . . . , ωN} be a q-ary c-IPP code that allows collusion of up to c users. The N -user
HybridIPP-PKTT scheme is a combination of ` basic Hybrid-PKTT schemes S1, S2, . . . , S`, each scheme
Si is for q users:
Setup: Given the security parameters λ and c:
For each j = 1, . . . , `, call the algorithm Hybrid-PKBE.Gen(1λ, q) to generate an encryption key
pkj and q decryption keys skj,1, . . . , skj,q for the q-user system Sj .
Public key: the tuple (pki)i=1,...,` and the code C.
Private key of each user: user i (for i = 1, . . . , N ) is associated to a codeword wi in C and the corre-
sponding `-tuple key sk1,wi,1 , sk2,wi,2 , . . . , sk`,wi,` where wi,j ∈ Q = {1, 2, . . . , q} is the symbol at
the jth position of the codeword wi.
Encryption algorithm: The plaintext space of the `-key system is M`. On input (m1,m2, . . . ,m`),
the encryption algorithm outputs the ciphertext (c1, c2, . . . , c`), where cj = Hybrid-PKBE.Encpkj (mj) =
(σj,1, . . . , σj,q, τj).
Decryption Algorithm: On the ciphertext (c1, c2, . . . , c`), user i uses his secret key to compute mj =
Hybrid-PKBE.Decskj,wi,j (cj).
Public Tracing Algorithm: For each j = 1, . . . , `, fix `− 1 valid ciphertexts c1, . . . , cj−1, cj+1, . . . , c`
and use the tracing algorithm of the instance Sj to trace a traitor uj ∈ Q = {1, 2, . . . , q} in this
instance. From the descendant word (u1, . . . , u`) ∈ Q`, identify one of its parent codewords. The
user associated with this codeword is a traitor.
Efficiency: The ciphertext contains two parts: ciphertext body (τ1, . . . , τ`) and ciphertext header (σj,1,
. . . , σj,q)j=1,...,`. The ciphertext body has approximately the same size as the message and the ci-
phertext header is proportional to q`. We can choose IPP code with small alphabet size such as q = 3
and the code length ` is a logarithmic function of the code size N . Thus, the ciphertext header has
fixed size and very small compared to the message size.
For the security analysis, one could use the following assumption, from [KY02]: the threshold as-
sumption says that a pirate-decoder that just returns correctly a fraction p of a plaintext of length λ
where 1 − p is a non-negligible function in λ, is useless. However, as already mentioned in [KY02], by
employing an all-or-nothing transform [Riv97,CDHKS00], this assumption is not necessary.
Proposition 5. The leak of the secret keys in the (` − 1) q-user systems of ` q-user systems does not
affect the security of the remained q-user system.
The proof of this proposition is quite similar to the corresponding ones in [KY02,CPP05] and can be
found in the full version [PST06].
This proposition combines with the fact that C is a c-IPP code, leads to following corollary:
Corollary 6. The above scheme is a N -user, c-traitor tracing scheme with full-public traceability.
We give an example of a concrete scheme in the full version [PST06]. This scheme is inspired from
the Cramer-Shoup scheme [CS03].
6 Conclusion
Motivated by an open problem proposed in CPP05, we extended Tag-KEM/DEM paradigm of hybrid en-
cryption to multi-receiver scenario and constructed a hybrid traitor tracing scheme that has the following
properties
– full public traceability, and thus is a comprehensive solution to the open problem of CPP05;
– blackbox traitor tracing algorithm that is error-free and always can identify correctly at least one
traitor. This is an important advantage of our scheme over [KY02,CPP05], because these schemes
use collusion secure code and the tracing algorithm of collusion secure code has error;
– it is a generic construction and provides significant improvement in terms of security and efficiency
and this is without resorting to new computational assumptions. In fact security is based on the
assumptions underlying security of the public key and symmetric key encryption systems used in
KEM and DEM, respectively. In comparison the scheme in [CPP05] (which supports local public
traceability against passive attack only) is based on new assumptions which are all stronger than the
standard Bilinear DDH assumption;
– the generic construction provides the following powerful composition
IPP code + CCA PKE + semantic secure DEM + target collision-free hash function
→ (relaxed) CCA HybridIPP -PKTT with full-public-traceability.
Our security proofs are in replayable CCA model. Although all previous schemes with constant trans-
mission rate achieve only semantic security against passive attack and so our scheme has much stronger
security level, it is a quite interesting question if similar results can be derived if CCA model is assumed.
Finally, combining revocation and public traceability to the Hybrid Traitor tracing scheme is an important
open problem.
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